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INHERENT PROBLEMS IN DFSIGNING 
TWO-FAILURE TOLERANT ELECTROMECHANICAL ACTUATORS 
Stephen Hornyak* 
ABSTRACT 
An electromechanical ac-powered rotary actuated four-bar linkage system for rotating the 
Shutt I~iCentaur deployment adapter is described. The essential features of the deployment adapter 
rotation system (DARS) are increased reliability for mission success and masimum practical hazard 
control for safety. This paper highlights the requirements, concept development. hardware con- 
figura;ion, quality assura,..t. provisions, and techniques used to meet two-fault tolerance re- 
quirements. I t  presents the rationale used to achieve a degree of safety equivalent of that of two- 
failure tolerance. Conditions that make this approach acceptable, including single failure point 
components with regard to redundancy versus credibility of failure modes, are also discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last 3 years, a NASA/DOD agreement led to the design. development, and procure- 
ment of the Centaur G-prime and Centaur G high performance upper stages. The configuration is 
derived from the flight-proven AtlasJCentaur and TitanICentaur vehicles. The Centaur G-prime is a 
NASA-unique version of the configuration that will launch the Galileo and International Solar Polar 
(ISPM) spacecraft. The Centaur G will carry and eject DOD-unique satellites into geostationary or 
I ?-hour orbits. The Centaur spacecraft will fly as a dedicated Shuttle payload. Integration of the 
Centaur upper stage into the Orbiter is accomplished by using the Centaur integrated support sys- 
tem (CISS), consisting of the Centaur support structure (CSS); deployment adapter (DA): and the 
associated CISS electronics, fluid, and mechanical systems. An overview of the ShuttleICentaur con- 
figuration is illustrated in Figure 1 .  
The DARS is part of the CISS mechanical systems and performs the DA rotation functiou for 
b, :, Centaur G-prime and Centaur G upper stages. This paper describes the rotation system design- 
ed for G-prime and discusses possible changes for the G version. 
The DARS is required to provide reliable DA positioning for Centaur separation and deploy- 
ment, to react pri~nary reaction control system (PRCS) jet moments during the erected position 
without latches, and to return the Centaur safely back ~o the stowed position in case of an aborted 
mission. Following a successr'ul Centaur ejection from the Orbiter cargo bay, the function of the 
DARS is to rotate the empty DA back to the stowed position and restrain i t  for Orbiter landing. In- 
dependent single-failure tolerant primary and backup rotators are used in combination to guarantee 
the effect of two-failure tolerance. The rotation system is fail-safe in that two failures will not lead 
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to  catastrophic hazard. Manual disengagement capability of the link, for contingency only, is pro- 
vided with the use of crew trained EVA (extra vehicular activity) to free a jammed rotator in orbit. 
The Centaur spacecraft can be then returned to  the stowed position using the contingency EVA 
winch (designed to restow the IUS manually) which is a slightly modified version of the contingency 
payload bay door winch mounted on the Orbiter forward bulkhead. 
The relationship between DARS and CJSS is shown in Figures 2 and 3. The DARS and the 
systems interfacing with DARS are shown in block diagram form in Figure 4. 
The concept, the requirements, and the procurement specification of the mechanisms described 
in this paper were developed by General Dynamics, which subcontracted the electromechanical 
rotator unit design, manufacturing, and testing to the Hoover Electric Company. 
REQUIREMENTS 
The requirements imposed on the rotator to perform several functions within severe constraints 
are summarized as follows: 
Safety Requirements (in accordance with NHB 1700.7A) 
Independent primary and backup rotation methods are required. 
Combination of primary and backup methods must be two-failure tolerant. 
Operational Requirements (in accordance with JSC-07700 Volume X, Appendix 10.16, Septem- 
ber 30, 1983) 
Erect Centaur to 36' minimum, 45' maximum rotation angle far Centaur separation. 
Erection capability required under active vernier reaction control system (VRCS) or free drift 
conditions (PRCS and Orbiter maneuvering system (OMS) translation modes inhibited during 
rotation). 
Capability required to react VRCS and PRCS loads while Centaur is in the erected position. 
OrbiterICCE (Centaur cargo element j dynamic interwtions shall be minimized. 
Multiple (up to six) erectionlrestow cycles anticipated for each mission; restow capability for 
abortive missions is required. 
Performance is required through 10 Orbiter missions over 10 years. 
Fatigue life must be designed to four times the expected number of mission cycles. 
Redundancy verification is required during turnaround. 
System Requirements (dzrived, assumed, or self imposed) 
Rotate DA to 45' in 4 to 5 minutes. 
Operation is required in both one g and zero g conditions. 
Disengage the crank clutches of both primary and backup rotators during ascent and reentry (in 
case of an aborted mission). 
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Figure 3. DA Rotation System Configuration (Left-Hand Side View). 
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Figure 4. DA Rotation System (Functional Block Diagram). 
Only one of the clutch or rotation motors shall operate at n time. 
Weight shall not exceed 310N (70 Ib) per rotator. 
Operation is required at temperature extremes from - 73' to 1 21°C (- 100 F to 250 F). 
The rotator must perform after exposure to severe vibroacoustic environments during Shuttle 
ascent to orbit, with special consideration for its installed position on the structural support ex- 
tending from the aft ri~ig of the DA. 
After a successful Centaur separation, the DA shall be returned to the reentry position 0.5' 
beyond the nominal stowed position of Centaur and preloaded against a stop using both 
rotators to react Orbiter landing loads safely. 
DA in any position must not violate the payload bay door envelope. 
Limit switches, crank position transducers, ac power, and avionics shall be two-failure tolerant. 
Software/Control requirements are: 
a. Automatic rotation operation after crew initiation. 
b. Automatic failure detection and reconfiguration. 
c. Orbiter signals are not required for operation. 
Ground checkout requirements are: 
a. One rotator to cycle DA with CSS in horizontal position. 
b. One rotator to cycle counterweighted DA with CSS in vertical position. 
Existing space technology (manufacturing and testing) developed for electromechanical rotary 
actuators employed in the Orbiter and other similar space applications shall be used as ap- 
plicable in the rotation system design. 
CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 
During the design selection phase, most of the problems centered around the two-failure 
tolerance requirement. Many different designs were conceived and eliminated in tradeoffs. Rack 
and pinion, ballscrew, chain, cable, and steel-belt drives - employing one or a combination of 
hydraulic, pneumatic, electrical, and pyrotechnically powered actuators - were evaluated against 
linkage drives. The linkage drive was selected for this application based on its excellent kinematic 
behavior. This ele~tromechanic~l quadric crank mechanism concept, which uses reliable technology 
already developed and tested for similar applications in the Orbiter, ensures trouble-free performance 
and avoids the c o s ~ ;  development usually associated with an innovative design and the inherent 
risks associated with meeting tight schedules. 
HARDWARE CONFIGURATION 
One DA rotator, illustrated in Figure 5, consists of the following major components. 
A. Rotary actuator, including the following subassemblies: 
(1) Power drive unit - a rotary electromechanical device consisting of two input channels 
driving a rotary output shaft through a reduction gearing arrangement that provides for 
independent operation of each input channel. The two input channels will not be operated 

concurrently. Failure of any onc' channel will not affect operation of the remaining chan- 
nel. The power drive unit output torque will meel the requirement> with either chwnel 
operating. 
Crank clutch unit - actuated by an electromechanical device similar to the power drive 
unit. The clutch will transmit the output shaft torque of the power drive unit into the 
crank shaft. The power drive clutch is located between the output shaft of the unit and the 
crank shaft. Limit switches are used to indicate engaged and disengaged clutch positions. 
The clutch also serves as a torque limiter, protecting the rotator and the interfacing struc- 
ture from overloads. 
Crank - transforms crank shaft torque into force in the link. Electrical rotary position 
transducers are used to indicate continuous crank position. 
Housing - supports the crank shaft, power driie unit, and crank clutch unit. I t  is capable 
of withstanding the full crank load and maximum vibration loads while bolted rigidly to 
the housing support structure on the DA. 
B. Link - The 1ir.k is pushed/pulled by the crank arm and transfers crank output into deploy- 
ment adapter position. The link has two self-aligning rod end bearings and is pinned to the 
CSS-mounted clevis. 
The rotator is designed to pxform the required functions under the following conditions: 
The available power is two-failure tolerant Orbiter 400 Hz 1 1 51200 vac, three-phase, four-wire 
for motors and 28 Vdc for limit switches and transducers. 
The two drive motors and the two clutch motors are identical, and each motor operates in- 
dependently. Failure of a motor or a power failure to that motor will be followed by switchirg 
off the disabled motor and switching on the second motor to complete the function. The de- 
energized motor does not interfere with the performance of its twin motor. Each is rated to per- 
form under the worst-case combination of temperature, altitude, voltage, frequency, and loads. 
0perati:lg time is 45" rotation in 4 to 5 minutes. 
Loads are divided into four catagories. The crank torque limit balues are as follows: 
(1 ) Operating in orbit-520 Nm (4,600 in-lb) 
(2) PRCS jet moments--2,940 to 4,070 Nm (26,000 to 36,000 in-lb) 
(3' Landing-2,920 Nm (25,800 in-lb) reacted by two rotators 
(4) Ground checkout-5 '0 Nm (5,000 in-lb 
Maximum slip torque at crank shaft-4,070 Nm (36,000 in-lb). 
Minimum transmission torque at crank shaft-2,940 Nm (26,000 in-lb). 
Rotator overall stiffness- 1 13,000 Nm (1.0 X 1 o6 in-lb) per radian minimum spring rate in the 
direction of crank rotation, measured at the center of the rotator mounting p!ate. 
Position transducers: Crank rotation between mechanical stops is monitored by three position 
transducers per rotator. A group of five transducers will be used sin~ultaneouslq, combining the 
primary and backup rotator transducers, to meet two-failure tolerant signal control criteria for 
Centaur positions, ensuring a three-versus-two vote by avionics in the worst-case condition. The 
sixth transducer is reserved for instrumentation 
Limit switches: The crank clutch unit has 12 single pole double throw limit switches. Six nor- 
mally open contacts of six independent switches wi!l close sirr.cltaneously to signal engaged 
clutch position and another group o i  six switches will signal disengaged clutch position. Five 
"engaged" and five "disengaged" limit switches o ~ t t  of each group of six switches will be used 
to meet two-failure tolerant crank clutch positian signal criteria. One engaged and one disengdg- 
ed switch will be uscc' for instrumentation. 
QUALITY ASSURAlYCE PROVISIONS 
Verification of  the requirements is accomplished by one or a comLination of the following 
methods: analysis, similarity, tcst, and inspection. The test program associated with the DA rotation 
is shown in Table 1 and summarized as follows. 
0 Individual Acceptance Tests (Hoover Electric Company) 
Q Qualification Tests (Hoover Electric Company) 
0 Design Evaluation Tests (General Dynamics, 
0 Factory Acceptance Tests (General Dynamics) 
Eastern Launch Site (ELS) Ground Checkout Tests (NASA/General Dynamics) 
The purpose of this extensive test program is to demmstrate adequacy of the design for the in- 
tended use and support two-failure tolerant capability. Qualification test durations are four times 
the duration of the anticipated number of mission duty cycles. Qualification testing will begin in 
August 1984 in parallcl with the Design Evaluation Test. 
TWO-FAILURE TOLERANCE RATIONALE 
Interpretation of redundancy, associated with static and dynamic component design, serves tq 
determine two-failure tolerant characteristics. 
There are inherent problems in the practical application of a two-failure tolerant elec- 
tromechanicai system that can be effectively studied in parallel with manned Orbil:er missions. With 
the presently available technology an3 many different interpretations of redunda~lcy, it is extremely 
difficult to design a truly two-failure tolerant transmissio~~ arrangement thdt transmits motive force 
from the electric motor to the link by gears, through a crank, while the crank is e:igaged by a clutch. 
This arrangement must also be simple, lightweight, irzxpensive, and most of a.ll reliat?!e. 
Empl- ying multiple levels of redunda~cy in electrical or fluid power transmission is relatively 
trobble free. Electricity or fluid media can be switched readily to maintain a continuous power s u p  
ply, and a jammed d a y  or valve does not hinder the course of action. Jamming of a mechanism. 
however, can stop an operation which can lead to hazardous situations. 
A two-failure !de19n1 electromechanicai design becomes complicated, especially in cases where 
more than one component can jam. Jam removal capability must be provided to allow continuation 
of the function in case the primary system stops functioniug (first failure) and switching to the 
5ackup system is impossible for any reason (second failure). 
Assume that a t.vo-failure tolerant remotely controlled mechanism has three independent 
means of accomplishing the assigned task or function. To ;:witch from the first to th: second 
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nwans and from the second to the third means, remotely controlled jam removal methods are re- 
quired for the engaging/disengaging mechanism of the first and second mcsns. The combination of 
thc first and second jam removal methods must be two-failure tolerant. If pin pu1lt;rs are used for 
ja1~1 removal, link capturing devices must be provided for the first and second means. The combina- 
tion of the first and second link capturing devices must be two-failure tolerant. This system is com- 
p icated, heavy, expensive, anc' - equires complex avionic and software systems. Reliability may be 
( egraded because of the comr .,xity. 
Ideally, there should be only one super-reliable means of performing the function, with a suffi- 
cient degree af built-in redundancy. I f  external jamming of the system is credible, a backup means is 
required and the primary means must be provided with redundant jam removal capability to allow 
the backup to function. 
The DA rotation system design follows the definitions, ground rules, and reliability techniques 
of Reliability Desk Instruction Dl No. 100-ZF, Failure Mode Erfect Analysis (FMEA), established 
for the Space Shuttle Orbiter subsystems to verify design adequacy with respect to inherent reliabili- 
ty. Some definitions and ground rules lronl this document follow. 
Definitions 
Failure - Inability of a s,stem, subsystem, component, or pPrt lo perform its required function 
within specified limits under specified cond;tions for a specit'icd duration. 
Failure Mode - A description of the manner in which an item can fail. 
Hazard - The presence of a potential risk situation caused bq an unsafe act or condition. 
Redundancy (depth of) - The available (number of) ways of performing a function*. 
*NASA SP-7, Dictionary of Technical Terms for Aerospace Use, defines redundancy as 
"the existence of more than m e  means for accomplisking a given tzr-k, where all means must fail 
before there is an overall failure to the system." 
"Purullel :-edirndur~c:r. applies to systems where both mar.,, are working at the same time to 
r;ccomplish the task, and d h e r  of the systems is catxkk of handling the job itself in case of 
failure of the other system. Srandb! redurdancj dpplies to a system where there is an ah-. native 
means of accomplishing the task :hat is switched in by a malfunction sensirlg device when the 
prin~ary system fails." 
Per N'ebster, the definition is "more than enough" or "superfluous. ' This interpretation 
may be the key to achieving equivalent safety by overdesigning the appropriate mechanical com- 
ponents instead of reaching for alternate means. 
Backup Mode of Operation - The avaiiable way(s) of performing a functio.7 wing "like" 
(identical) hardware. 
a Alternate hlode of Operation - Any additional ways of performing a function using "unlike" 
hardware. 
Criticality - The categorization of a hardware item by the worst-case potential direct effect of 
fzilure of that item. In  assigning hardware criticality, the availability 5:' redundancy is con- 
sidered. Assignment of functional criticality, however, assumes the loss of all redundant 
(backup or alternate) hardware elements. 
Single Failure Point - A single item of hardware, the ~'ailure of which would lead directly to loss 
-- 
*NASA SP-7, Dictionary of Technical Terms for Aerospace Use-Defmition of redundancy 
of life, vehicle, or mission. Where safety considerations dictate that abort be initiated when a 
redundant item fails, that item is also considered a single failure point. 
Critical Item - A single failure point or a rbdundant element in a life or mission-essential appli- 
cation where: 
a. Redundant elements are not capable of checkout during the normal ground turnaround se- 
quence. 
b. Loss of a redundant element is not readily detectable in flight. 
c. All redundant elements can be lost by a single credible cause or event such as contamination 
or explosion. 
Ground Rules 
Dual redundancy: 
a. The first failure would result in loss of mission. 
b. The next related failure would result in loss of life or vehicle. 
The loss of all redundant elements by a single credible cause or event is considered unlikely. 
Where redundancy esists in the subsys~em, the redundancy is considered during failure analysis. 
"Alternate means of operation" refels LO accomplishment of a function and not necessarily to 
redundancy or restoration of a failed function. 
Failure of structural items (primary or secoi!dary) will not be considered in this analysis. (Struc- 
tural items are assumed to be designed to preclude faiiure by use of adequate design safety 
factors.) 
The FMEA for the rotator has been prepared and submitted by Hoover Electric as part of the 
vendor critical design review. 
WAIVER 
A waiver request was subnritted to the customer specifically to exclude cluiches and gear trains 
inside sealed gear boxes, as well as linkages from multiple level redundancy requircrnents. This ap- 
proach is similar to the rationale employed in the Orbiter electromechanical technology, waiving 
gearing. linkage, and structural component failures as being unlikely (noncredible). 
Thcre :ire indications. Iiowcver, tliat this waiver may nor be approved for tlic Sdl-lcngtli 
payloads, \r liich block LC .A egress. Suggested solutions arc: 
a. Addirio~ of a rcmotcly actl!aicd pin puller and capture device to the primary rotator l inh .  
rhis woLrld ~ , l ov  rhc nriniary rotator link to be "brohcn" if tlic prinliir)' drive and clutch 
disengagement mcc'ianisrns botli Sailed. Rotation cot!ld contir!uc wing r he ~cconda~ y rotator 
system. 
b. Use ol'an energy storage drrice (e.g., a spring) to hold the stack in a normally-stowed posi- 
tion with remote pin-pul!crs at the drive links in case of niultiple meci~anisrn failure. Acrua- 
tion o1'thc pin puller\ would resulr in auroniatic return of  Cenraur/paylozd stack to its slow- 
ed con Sigurat ion. 
c. Design of the clutches so that it' the primary clutch fails to disengage, the backup ro,r!ic r 
can produce sufl'icier~t torque ro cause the primary rotator dutcli 11) dip, 11111s pcrniitring 
rotation ro conrinuc. 
011w suitable nletllods may be srudied to develop acceptable design nlodifications to rtleet the 
I~O-l'nilurc tolerance rcquircnienr or achie\e equi\alcnr sakry. In view of the criricalir y of the 
(i-primc sclicdulc. i r  \\auld be in~practical 10 impose any unique payload requirenicnts on rhc 
G-prime rorar iorl sysrcm 31 1111, lime. 
RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE 
Summary - Two-failure tolerance is provided to the maximum extent practical. Two independent 
rotator systems are provided. Each system includes a power drive unit that contains two indepen- 
den: drive motors. Each of the two motors in each powei drive unit is capable of rotating the Cen- 
taur up for launch (separation) and down to stow for landing. Each power drive unit engages its 
rotation linkage through a clutch that is actuated by one of two independent motors. Such engage- 
ment does not occur until just before rotstion in orbit. Three independent ac p w e r  sources are 
snitched through the two-failure tolerant ationics system to provide two-failure tolerant power to 
each power drive and clutch motor. Each motor is controlled by an ac source, in which three in- 
dependent series inhibits are placed. I f  any two ;.c sources, inhibits, or control units fail, the system 
nil1 not rotate inadvertently and will still permit up or down rotation. The system meets the t ~ o -  
failure requirt.ments in all components except the power drive .,;lit clutches, gezrtrains, and muc- 
rural linkage. An engaged clutch that fails to diswgage, in conjunction with a jammed geartrain in 
the same power drive unit. would prevent rotation of the Centaur, as would failure of both clutches 
or geartrains. However, the combination of the drive and clutch motors of the primary and backup 
rotators are quad redu~itlant, while each rotator is responding to triple redundant avi~nic ommand 
inputs. I t  should be noted that the DA rotation system has a higher level of failure tolerance than 
any Orbiter electroniechanical system. For inslance, any of the three active payload holddown lat- 
C I I C S  jamwed in the latched position will prevent rotatiw of the Ceutaur and block EVA. 
Discussion - The sequence used LO rotate the Centaur after the cargo bay doors are opened is as 
follows: 
Thc Orbiter turns on acl and ac2 (ac3 is aiways present at the Orbiter interface). 
Commands from the standard switch panel (SSP) will start Centaur airbo~ne support equipment 
(CASE) controlled operations by engaging the primary clutch with motor 1. If this motor fails, 
motor 2 will eutomatically be a c t i ~ t e d .  When the clutch is fully engaged, the motor (I or 2) is 
turned off. 
The Orbiter commands the release of its Ceniaur holddown latches. 
Commands from the SSP will then activale the primary drive motor 1 and automatically rotate 
the Centaur out of the cargo bay. If this motor fails, primary drive motor 2 will automatically 
be activated to rotate t'le Centaur. 
At the erected position, the drive motor ( i  or 2) is turned off automatically. The Orbiter may 
then secure power sourccs ac 1 and ac 2. 
I f  a failure(s) occurs that prevent5 or halts Centaur rotation, the CASE cor,trol system will 
automaticaily switch over to the completely separate end redundant backup rotaror system. Rota- 
tion may then be continued by reinitiating commands from the SSP to erect cv s t o ~  the Centaur. 
3 he CASE control system will then activate the components of the backup system in the same man- 
ner and sequence as previously mentioned to continue engagement or rotation. 
The Orbiter crew can use the SSP to override or back out of the primary or bilckltp operatidnal 
sequence at any point. This includes returning the Centaur to the completely stowed position for a 
mission abort. 
The DA rotation system is safe as designed and analyzed and may be classified as a cargo 
element/payload of the Orbiter for the following reasons: 
Each rotator is capable of performing a minimum of 1,000 duty cycles during its operating !i!'c, 
which is far in excess cf  the 10-mission requirement. The structural ultimate factor of safety is 
1.4 (minimum). The components of the system have adequate strength and stiffness. Gear stress 
levels are one-fourth of the material ultimate stresses. 
Clutches are designed with separation springs between the clutch plates to prevent binding aitrr 
the clutch is disengaged. 
Bearings, such as those used for the links, incorporate multiple rotating surfaces to ensure rhar 
rotational capability exists following surface-to-surface binding of one rotating surface. The life 
of each rotational surface is adequate to meet the full operating life of the item. I f  multiple rota- 
tional surfaces are not provided, the LIO life of each bearing or rolling element nil1 escred the 
required life by a minimum factor of 17. 
In case multiple sliding surfaces are not provided, the normally lubricated surfaces \\.ill slide 
without lubricat~on, t l~us providing one-failure tolerance. Also, test and design data obtained 
from the manufacturer show that the minimum power available to restow the Centaur is 3.2 
times the worst-case restow forces. 
To prevent a single-point structural failure, the single structural component and the clutch com- 
ponents have built-in redundancy by oversizing the component for strength. In this case. the 
limit load is modified to include a suitable safety factor, and the maximum anticipated load is 
multiplied by that chosen safety factor. Selection of the ~edlindancy safety factor depends on 
individual credible failure modes related to the function of the single component and analyzed 
on a case-by-case basis. 
The crank remains in its last acttiated position until powered to a nei\ position. Nei1lii.r an out- 
of-tolerance condition nor a single component failure affects holding of position or n i w  ins to a 
new position. 
Threaded parts and fas!eners are positivelv locked to prevent loosening duri-ig service. Single- 
fastener attachments have dual-locking features. 
Gearboses are designed to preclude entry of foreign materials, loss of lubricants, and jamming 
of gears. No threaded fasteners are used inside the gearbox. I~iternal volume is kept to a prac- 
tical minimum. 
Qualification tests will be performed to prove functional capability under extreme environmerl- 
tal conditions. Ground checkout tests before launch and ELS quality control operations wil: be 
performed. 
The manufacturer, Hoover Electric, has den~onstrated the capability for designing and bui!.ding 
similar devices, as exhibited by various electromechanical accllators provided for the Space 
Shuttle vehicle (e.g., esternal tank umbilical door drive actuator, external tank umbilical door 
centerline latch actuator, external tank umbilical door latch drive actuator, payload hay door 
bulkhead latch actuator, payload bay door centerline latch actuator, radiator panel latch ac- 
tuator, radiator panel drive actuator, and manipulator positioning mechanism actuator). The 
DA rotator employs the same cmcepts and some identical hardware used in these flight- 
qualified actuators. 
CONCLUSION 
The DA rotator design has required state-of-the-art space technology to produce a very reliable 
rotation system for the Centaur G-prime and G vehicles. Proper interpretation of redundancy is 
essential for hardware acceptance. This can be demonstrated by using proven electromechanical 
design methods, careful selection of materials, and with full understanding of hardware and func- 
tional criticalities. Simplicity and commonality can greatly improve reliability and safety while 
achieving mission objectives. Interpretation of redundancy is necessary to facilitate the method of 
attaining equivalent safety that matches the effect of two-failure tolerance by overdesigning the 
single critical components. Gears, clutches, and linkage are not two-ki!ure tolerant; however, they- 
are considered acceptable because of ultra-conservative wear, stress, and life factors. The author's 
observation is that a more esplicit definition and guidance tailored for electromechanical designs for 
space application would be instrumental i r ,  equating redundancy to equivalent safety based on credi- 
ble failure modes of individual components and would help eliminate doubt during the design 
phase. Differing definitions of redundancy can Ic.id to disagreements resulting in possible design 
chanses impactins scliedule and cost. 
